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MORAL CONSIDERATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
[Continued.]
In Lycoming vs. UnionI the question arose as to the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature, which provided that Lycoming and
Northumberland counties should pay to Union county their proportional parts of the expenses involved in certain litigation. The same
legal questions bad arisen simultaneously in the three counties, and, to
save the time of the courts of two of the three counties, the Legislature had provided that the question be settled by a trial in Union
county only. Later it ordered the other counties to contribute to the
expense of the Union county trial. Lycoming county took the position that this deprivation of property was neither "by the judgment of
peers," nor "by the law of the land," as required by the Bill of Rights.
Bell, J., held that the Legislature acted within the scope of its constitutional power, since it was acting in pursuance of one of "those
duties which, resting only in good morals, are sometimes called imperfect obligations, because, though recommended by conscientious convictions, they yet lack a remedy sufficient to compel the due observance of them .......
.. The defendant occupies the position of one
to whom a service has been rendered by another, though not at his
request. This species of benefit has long since been recognized by our
courts as creating a moral duty in the recipient sufficient to furnish a
consideration for a subsequent promise to pay."
In Loan Association vs. Stonemetz 2 the unqualified statements of
the preceding cases was limited by the condition that if the one conferring the benefit did so while acting in the line of his duty, the
recipient is under no moral obligation to pay for the benefit received.
A member of the Loan Association had, as chairman of a committee,
15 Pa. 166 (1850.)
2 29 Pa. 534 (1857.)
1

See also Hartman's Appeal, 3 Grant 271.
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performed very laborious services, and the association passed a resolution to pay him therefor. The secretary drew an order on the treasurer,
but before it was paid the motion was reconsidered, and he was refused
payment. It was held that there was no consideration, and that the
Association was therefore free to change its mind. It was said that
" although he performed his work faithfully, his labors fell within the
limit of his duty as a director, and the fact that he performed them
with an exuberance of good faith, imposed upon the corporation no
moral duty to pay for them.

.

.

.

When the resolution was passed

the consideration bad been executed, for the services to be compensated
had been previously rendered, and there is no proof of a precedent or
contemporaneous request. It is quite true that they were beneficial to
the defendant, and a request might, in the liberal spirit of modern
decisions be implied, but in the instance of graluilousservices performed
by a party in the line of his legalduty, there is no case which authorizes
such an inference."
In Landis vs. Royer', A ordered the lumber for a house he was
building from B. B in turn secured the lumber from C, and it was
incorporated irn the building. B failing to pay C for the lumber, A
promised to pay him, but did not do so. Sharswood, J.. held that if
B had really been relying upon the " credit of the defendant's building," it "would have been immoral and unjust for the defendant to
enjoy the plaintiff's property without paying him for it." And the
general principle was reiterated " that a benefit derived from the unsolicited services of another, creates a moral obligation to compensate
that other, and though not enough, without a previous request, to
give rise to an implied promise 2 , it is sufficient to sustain an express
assumption."
In Albany City Insurance Company vs. Whitneya, A had removed
and saved the cargo and furniture from a wreck belonging to B. B
then promised to pay the expense involved in the salvage. In an
action of assumpsit upon this promise, Sharswood, J., said: "It may
be that such an action would not lie for salvage without a promise to
pay, because being a voluntary service, performed without previous
request, there is no sufficient consideration to support an implied
assumpsit. But a benefit conferred or service rendered, though purely
voluntary, is sufficient consideration to support an express promise."
A borough has no authority to spend public money in an effort to
show that the annulment of its charter would be inexpedient, and when
private individuals spend money in an effort to prevent such a result,

1 59 Pa. 95. 2 Musser vs. Ferguson Township, 55 Pa. 475 (1867.)
a 70 Pa. 248.
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the borough is under no moral obligation to reimburse them.

Council,

therefore, may not appropriate public money for this purpose."'
But when a teacher performs services for a city after election by a
sectional school board, the failure of the board of education to confirm
the election imposes upon the city a moral obligation to pay for the
services rendered "under claim and color of right and title, and this
will render valid an appropriation by council to pay her." 2
If, as appears from the foregoing cases, the moral obligation arises
though the beneficiary is ignorant of the fact that he is being benefitted at the time the benefit is being conferred, it is clear that if the
benefit is conferred " with the knowledge, assent and encouragement
of the beneficiary, it creates a moral obligation, which is a sufficient
consideration for a promise." 3
The moral obligation to pay for benefits received may be counterbalanced by another moral obligation existing between the parties and
in pursuance of which the benefit has been conferred. For example,
though a rich father expressly promises his minor daughter to give her
$1,500 when she shall come of age, if she shall "remain with him and
be a good girl," such a promise is without consideration, though the
condition be performed. And though the father, in pursuance of his
promise, executes his note for $1,500 when the child becomes of age,
the note is unenforceable, since the daughter was only doing her duly in
4
doing what she did.
In a rather similar case, Ross's Appeal, 5 the note was sealed, so
that the absence of consideration could not defeat it. In this case the
lower court gave expression to a misleading dictum that was passed
without criticism by the Supreme Court. It was said: "A seal imports a consideration, but there is here a good consideration in the
natural affection of a father for his children and his obligation to provide for them." Judge Hanna was later actually mislead by this into
giving judgment on a note for $30,000 executed by a grandfather in
favor of a favorite grandchild, though no valuable consideration was

alleged.

6

But if a child, after reaching his majority, continues in his father's family and assists in the work, while no promise to pay him is
implied from the receipt of his services, the advantages of a child's
position and the cost of his maintenance being regarded as a set-off,

1 Webster vs. Hopewell Borough, 19 Super. Ct. 549.
2 Baily vs. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 569.
3 Cornell vs. Vanartsdalen, 4 Pa. 364 (1846.) And see Cook vs. Dunn
2 Clark 515.
4 Cowen's Estate, 3 Pitts. Reps. 471 (1871.)
5 127 Pa. 4.
6 Kern's Estate, 171 Pa. 55.
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yet it is held that there is a moral obligation to allow him something
more, and if an express promise to pay is made, though unsealed, it
will be enforced. As was said in Sutch's estate, I "the moral debt is a
good consideration for the legal promise."
In all of the cases of the last class the moral obligation has arisen
from a benefit conferred by the promisee upon the promisor. In the following cases the promisee has suffered some loss, and the question is
as to the duty of the promisor to repair if, this duty arising from some
other cause than the receipt of a benefit from the promisee.
For example, if A has designed to give a- legacy to B, but he is
dissuaded by C through C's assurance that he will provide for B, the
fact that C has been the occasion of this loss to B will create a moral
obligation to see that B is provided for, and if C gives B his note in
pursuance of the promise, it will be enforced. At least this is true if
the money diverted from B is given by A to C. In such a case C
becomes a trustee for B to the extent that he has promised to provide
for him, 2 and a note given to C for this amount will be supported "by
the moral obligation." 3 But a promise by a husband after the death
of his wife to pay her children a certain amount, which was equal to
that which she brought him at marriage, and which by the law then in
force became his absolute property, is without consideration.
Again the promisor may unwittingly have been the cause of a loss
to the promisee, and the question arises whether he ought not in conscience to repair or at least share the loss. A trustee, let us say,
without any negligence makes an investment or otherwise so manages
the trust estate that loss results to the cesluz que trust. Justice Gibson
has held that in such a case there is not even a moral obligation to
repair the loss.5
Again, the promoters of a business enterprise may make misrepresentations honestly believed to be true, and confiding investors may
lose heavily as the result. Should a promise by the promoter to an
investor to share his loss be enforced? In Martin's Estate 6 upon such
a state of facts, Furgeson, J., was of the opinion that a moral obligation did arise to repair the loss, but having pursued his investigations
among the text writers rather than in the Pennsylvania reports, he
was convinced that the rule of the note to Wennall vs. Adney constitutes the Pennsylvania rule, and as there had never been a legal obligation here which had been lost by lapse of time or otherwise, or

1 201 Pa. 305.
2 Hoge vs. Hoge, 1 Waits 163.
3 Gaullaher vs. Gallauher, 5 Watts 200.
4 Murphy's Estate, 11 Phila. 2.
5 McPherson's Administrators vs. Rees, 2 P. and W. 521.
6 5 C. C. R. 555 (1888) and 131 Pa. 638,
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which but for some technical rule of law would have been a legal obligation, he held that there could be no recovery. On -appeal, Justice
McCollum refrained from expressing approval or disapproval of the
lower court's statement of the Pennsylvania.rule, and decided the case
on the ground that there really was no moral obligation in such a
case. He said : " There is no moral obliquity in the statement of an
honest belief respecting a business enterprise, and no legal or moral
obligation is created by it."
Again, suppose an employee is injured or suffers loss under such
circumstances that he has no legal claim for damages, is the employer
under a moral obligation to help him, and should- a promise to do so
be on this account converted into a contract ?
In Moyer and Morgan vs. Kirby,I A was erecting a house for B
under a contract. When the work was almost completed, the house
was blown down. B, moved by sympathy, promised to pay A an
additional sum fqr rebuilding. Pearson, J., held that, as the promise
was simply to pay A for doing what he was already legally bound to
do, there was no consideration. He said : " However this court
might feel disposed to divide the loss between the parties, or hold B to
his promise as a maller of honor, we cannot enforce it as a matter of
law."
Lastly we come to that important class of cases in which the obligation arises from the fact that the pronmisee has acted in reliance upon
the promise, and to allow a disappointment of his expectations involves an apparent injustice. Here the obligation follows the promise
and the absurdity of calling it a consideration is greater than usual.
Yet so effective in beclouding the reasoning of the courts has this
moral obligation notion been, that even this ahsurdity has been perpetrated.
In Caul vs. Gibson, 2 suit was brought on a subscription to'a
church building fund. Work was done on the church in reliance on
the subscriptions. Burnside, J., said: " When the inhabitants of a
village or neighborhood sign a subscription authorizing the building of
a church for the public worship of God, and the persons so authorized
proceed to erect the house, there is a moral obligation in all the subscribers to fulfill their engagements. A moral obligation has ever
been held a sufficient consideration to support an express promise, but
not an implied one. . . . I think that subscriptions to all kinds
of Christian churches, school-houses, academies and colleges, when
buildings are erected in pursuance of the subscription, the highest
moral duty is placed on the subscribers to faithfully fulfill their engagements. "
1 2 Pearson 64.
2 3 Pa. 416 (1846.)
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Whether the court thought the moral duty arose from the duty to
support such worthy objects as churches, or from the promisee's
change of position in reliance upon the promise, or from both together,
is bard to tell. In any event there is nothing here that can with any
propriety be called a consideration. Late cases frankly recognize that
such cases are as emphatic exceptions to the requirement of a consideration in contracts as are the cases of contracts under seal. They are
sustained on the ground of a quasi-estoppel.t
In Stokes' Estate 2 it is said-,' Any obscurity which may appear
in the cases (of this class) probably arises from the hold which the
objects of these promises have obtained upon our sympathies, and not
from any difficulties in applying the ordinary rules governing contracts.
For if a violation of a promise purely voluntary, to aid in a project ot
benevolence, carries with it greater turpitude than would attend the
breach of a similar undertaking in a business enterprise, the law at
least cannot recognize the distinction."
However, the courts do recognize a distinction. If the promisee is a

charity, they invoke the so-called estoppel doctrine. If the promisee is
an individual, they forget about estoppel and demand consideration.
For example, in Richards' Executor vs. Richards, 3 A was contemplating moving to the west. B advised him to buy a farm and stay
where he was, promising him that he would furnish him with a certain
needed balance of purchase money. A stayed and bought the farm in
reliance on B's promise, but B did not pay. Justice Lowrie said:
"Assurances of assistance accompanying kind advice are never intended as contracts. And conformance to advice is never intended to
stand as a legal consideration for the kind assurances that accompany
the advice, though it is a motive for their fulfillment."
Dougherty vs. Torrance 4 was a bard case of the same kind. A
told B that he wished she might have a house of her own in which she
could keep boarders and lodgers, and thus make a living. B said she
thought the suggestion a good one, and A then said he would "furnish" her the sum .of $6,ooo for this purpose. Relying on this promise
B surrendered the house in which she was then living, stored her furniture, and began to negotiate for a suitable property. In a suit on A's
promise, judgment was for the defendant for want of consideration.
We are tempted to wonder if the result would have been the same if
the plaintiff had been a large church congregation instead of a woman.

I See Lippincott's Estate, 21 Super Ct. 214 (1902), Phipps vs. Jones, 20
Pa. 264, and Stokes' B state, 9 W. N. C. 439 (1881).
2 9 W. N. C. 439.

* 46 Pa. 78.
*

25 C. C. Reps. 317 (1900).
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Finally, as a further indication of the curious condition of the law
in Pennsylvania upon this subjeqt, let us compare two quotations from
opinions by the present Chief justice. In Bailey vs. Philadelphia, r67
Pa. 569 (1895), after defining a moral obligation in law, he says: "In
this state it is held that such an obligation will sustain an express
promise to pay ;" while in Kern's Estate, 17. Pa. 55, we find him
giving expression to this significant remark: " But the argument
falls into confusion from the indiscriminate use of the terms 'moral
obligation' and 'moral consideration.' They are not convertible
terms, even tf there is any such thing as a moral consideration."
Whether the Chief Justice means to criticise the application of the
term "moral consideration" to those moral obligations which are
recognized as substitutes for 6 consideration, or whether he intended to
raise a doubt as to the finality of his emphatic declaration of a few
months before, the writer is unable to determine.
It has been said that the doctrine that a pre-existing moral obligation to do the thing promised may serve in the place of a consideration,
renders illogical, if it does not destroy, the whole theory of consideration.' For if a promise is to be enforced becanse it recognizes a moral
duty, is there any valid reason to deny the sufficiency of a subsequent
moral obligation; and if not, then must we not recognize as sufficient
the moral duty to perform every -promise which arises from the deliberate making of it? Certainly all men recognize the moral wrong
involved in a failure to keep a promise that another has relied on,. and
especially so where the promisee in such reliance has so arranged his
affairs, or has incurred tuch obligations that a disappointment will
involve serious financial loss. If, then, the purpose of the courts is to
compel men to perform their moral duties, surely they should enforce
all promises seriously made.
The law frequently implies promises, i. e., it compels a man to do
"what reason and justice dictate "2 on the supposition contrary to
fact that he has promised to do it. As Lord Holt has said, an implied
promise is a "metaphysical notion." Since then the courts have
invaded the field of metaphysical notions to compel a man to do his
duty, not because he has promised to do it, but because it is his duty, 3
why should they excuse him from doing what he has in fact promised
to do ?
To intentionally mislead"another to his damage by a mis-statement
of fact renders one liable for the tort of deceit. Why, then, should
one not be held responsible who has intentionally misled another by a

and Eng. E4ncyc. of Law, 679.
2 B1. Comm. 443.
a See Chapter III of Hilliard on Contracts.
1 6 Am.

2
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promise he has not kept?" There was a time when the action for
deceit lay for breach of a parol promise. 2 Why do not the Pennsylvania courts, with their high regard for moral obligations, revive this
liability, and excuse the plaintiff from the nuisance of showing a consideration? A western state3 has done so. Why does not Pennsylvania? When the defendant plead the want of consideration for his
promise, the Nebraska court said: " Having intentionally influenced
the plaintiff to alter her position for the worse on the faith of the note
being paid when due, it would be grossly inequitable to permit the
maker to resist payment on the ground that the promise was given
without consideration."
Chief Justice Shaw has said 4 that "it is difficult to reduce -this
principle (that a moral obligation is a consideration) to a rule sufficiently accurate for practical use, on account of the looseness and
uncertainty attending the notion of moral obligation or moral duty."
But the Pennsylvania courts" do not feel any embarrassment from this
source. They delight in "plain rules." 5 How, then, we ask, can
they escape enforcing every promise that is solemnly made? But if
they do, what becomes of Blackstone's definition of a contract-" An
agreement upfon szuocient consideration to do or not to do a particular
thing?"
May we not with reason pray our courts either to drop this talk
of " moral obligations " or else expressly repudiate the requirement of
consideration in contracts? The " plain rule" of Judge Black is no
rub- at all. There are many moral obligations that are rejected as
considerations, and the only means of deciding a question of this sort
is to take it to our court of last resort.
In New York, where the limitations of the English rule are not
strictly observed, the test is : " Did the promisor personally receive a
benefit at some period, from which the moral obligation has arisen ?"6
But even this limitation is rejected, as we have seen, in Pennsylvania.
Baron Parke said that "a mere moral consideration is nothing."7
That such a statement could be made does not seem "at first sight
very creditable to the common law."
It is like putting marriage in
the same category with money, as illustrations of valuable considerations. 8 Baron Parke, however, appreciated the " extreme difficulty of

14 Harv. Law Rev. 184.
Harriman on Contracts, Sec. 618.
3 Ricketts vs. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51.
. Valentine vs. Foster, 1 Metcalf 520.
" Per Judge Black, supra.
2

"

Goulding vs. Davidson, 26 N. Y. 604.
vs. Brown, 9 M. and W. 501.

JJennings

" Parsons on Contracts, 9th ed., p. 469.
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deciding between considerations bearing a moral aspect, which were,
and which were not, sufficient to sustain an action at law," and the
conclusion he reached seemed the only practicable one. When the
American courts began to record decisions recognizing a moral obligation as a consideration, there were not wanting thoughtful writers who
warned the courts that they were getting into a quagmire from which
they would have difficulty in extricating themselves,' but as we have
seen-, the warning was not heeded. In most states the courts have
had force enough to throw themselves out of the mire and to plant
themselves on the solid ground of the present English rule. In Pennsylvania, whether from lack of force or from reverence for early mistakes, or from a desire to be peculiar, the court of last resort persists
in laying down " the plain rule." Notwithstanding this " plainness,"
we find a respectable text writer as late as 1896 confessing 2 his inability to ascertain from the conflicting decisions what the law of Pennsylvania is on this vexed question.
Mr. Bishop, in his work on contracts, referring to this "untenable doctrine of moral obligation," 3 uses this emphatic language:
"Such a doctrine, carried to its legitimate results, would release the
tribunals from the duty to administer the law of the land, and put, in
the place of law, the varying ideas of morals which the changing
incumbents of the bench might from time to time entertain." Suppose
a county in Pennsylvania chooses as its judge a superlatively conscientious judge. He is impressed with the importance of the obligations
of piety and religion, and is asked to decide the following case under
the Pennsylvania law: A poor man with a large family is aroused to
a high pitch of religious excitement by the harrowing tales of a returned missionary. In this condition he subscribes $5oo for missionary
work among the Sandwich Islanders. Suit is brought on the subscription. The judge must admit that there is a moral obligation
to send the Gospel to the heathen, and the defendant has expressly
promised to contribute to this cause. How can he avoid giving judgment for the plaintiff, even though he may know that execution of the
judgment will ruin the defendant?
" If there were no other reason for acquiescing in the English
rule," says Mr. Hare, 4 "it would be enough that there are no certain
means of ascertaining which, among the multitude of moral obligations, will uphold an express promise. Men owe much to their
kinsmen, their friends and their neighbors, that cannot be withheld

1 See Article in 21 Amer. Jurist 280, written in 1839.
2 Hollingsworth on Contracts, p. 135.
s P. 17, Sec. 44.

4 Hare on Contracts, p. 269.
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without a violation of the moral law, and it would be equally difficult
to maintain that this is a sufficient consideration for an assumpsit in
every such instance, and to distinguish the cases where an action will
lie from those which should be left to the decision of the individual

conscience. "
It is always gratifying in the administration of the law to enforce
the precepts of natural justice, but the law cannot successfully compel
the performance of all the moral duties even by those who have expressly assumed to fulfill them.
There are many duties to our fellow-men which an enlightened
conscience recognizes, that are either too refined to be discerned, too
indefinite to be prescribed, or too imperfect to be enforced by human
institutions, or which are regulated by a standard of morals too high
to be applied as an ordinary instrument for measuring legal obligation.
Those duties which are plain, definite and positive, and which can be
practically enforced in the bilsiness of life, are recognized as legal obligations, and an undertaking to perform them is raised through the
fiction of an implied promise. But a promise, however express, must
be regarded as a nude pact if founded solely on a consideration which
the law holds insufficient to create a legal obligation, and from which
no implied promise could be inferred.'
In short, any reference to moral obligation as a standard for estimating legal obligations, is to be deplored. In Tiffany's Clark on
Contracts 2 it is urged that the custom of referring to moral obligation
as the foundation of the exceptions contained in the modern English
rule as laid down in Eastwood vs. Kenyon, be abandoned, and that the
validity of the promise in those cases be based " on the prior agreement, supported by a valuable consideration, and the right of the
promisor to waive the technical rules of law, meant for his benefit, and
which render it unenforceable."
If this view be taken, (and why
should it not be?) we will again be able to safely state that a "moral
obligation can never support a promise," or, to use the words of
Baron Parke: "A mere moral consideration is nothing.".
In the days of Lord Mansfield, when the need of a consideration
to support a promise was still being debated, we need not be surprised
that the moral obligation idea should have been given a hearing, but
that a modern court should continue to reiterate such loose doctrine is,
to say the least, surprising. Sir Frederick Pollock has suggested an
explanation of the origin of the anomaly, but he personally repudiates
the doctrine with emphasis. 3 He says: " Historically the truth of

I See Hatchell vs. Odom, 2 Dev. and Bat. 302 (19 N. C.)
2 2d Ed. 1904, p. 142.
3 Pollock on Contracts, 4th Ed. *p. 171 and 172.
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the matter seems to be that suitors and judges have made attempts in
various directions to strain legal principles for the purpose of making
These attempts were, in part,
people fulfill promises........
favored by the confused and fictitious manner in which all quasi-contractual transactions were treated; request, consideration and promise
having become, instead of the names of real facts, counters for pleaders to play with. In many cases the enterprise failed, in some it succeeded." The moral obligation doctrine is one of the successes that
has survived to date in Pennsylvania.
If it is felt that a promise to pay for a past benefit, received from
the promisee under circumstances creating no duty to pay therefor,
should be enforced, let the courts frankly state that they are enforcing
a promise without consideration, and let the exception be thus clearly
defined. But let them cease beclouding the whole idea of consideration with their talk of moral obligation. The Indian Contract Act'
has preserved a right to enforce such promises, but it frankly classifies
the case as an exception to the requirement of consideration. The
Pennsylvania courts have always enforced a promise under seal, though
the deliberate intention of the promisor was to confer a gratuitous
benefit. Since there is this exception to the requirement of consideration, why not introduce others, if necessary? But let the scope of the
exception be defined, and let us no longer see the court taking refuge
behind such nebular expressions as " moral obligation."
Unless something of this kind is done a premium will continue to
be placed upon litigation. As an indication of what we have in store
for us, we may note some of the moral obligations which have not yet
been considered by the Pennsylvania courts, but which have been
urged upon courts in other jurisdictions wherever any toleration for
this notion has been shown. A husband makes a promise to X to pay
her $i,ooo because he believes it his duty to carry out the wishes of
his deceased wife, and this, though he received no estate from his
wife.2 Should the promise be enforced? A discharges a servant for
drunkenness. The servant had entered A's employ with the stipulation that if he should be drunk, he would forfeit his wages. But A,
moved by pity, nevertheless promises to pay. Has the receipt of the
services imposed a- moral duty to pay for them?' A sold to B a vicious
horse without warranty. A month later, from a sense of fairness, he
volunteered to warrant the horse for one year. A knew of defects in
the horse when he sold him, and he make a good bargain, but the
defects in the horse were such. that the doctrine of" caveat emntor"

I Sec. 25.
Peek vs. Peek, 77 Cal. 106. 1 L. R. A. 185.
2 Schnell vs. Nell, 17 Ind. 29.
s Maukman vs. Shepherdson, 11 Ad and Bll. 409.
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would prevent a recovery. Does the moral obligation not to take advantage of your neighbor render A's voluntary warranty enforceable ?1
A has conferred benefits on B's father without any return. A is now
in need and B is in affluent circumstances. Will B's promise to pay A
a definite sum be supported by the moral obligation ?2
Again, suppose A sells his farm to B at a price which is fixed on
the hypothesis that the farm contains a certain number of acres.
Later, discovering a deficiency in the quantity of land, A promises to
return part of the price. Will the moral duty not to get money without giving its value in e:tchange support the promise to pay ?3
A child is taken from the streets and maintained and educated by
a charitably disposed person, expecting no return. After coming of
age the child unexpectedly comes into a fortune, and his benefactor
meets with reverses and is in want. Will the moral obligation to do
so support the child's promise to share his fortune ?4
A receives property from B under a contract made on Sunday, or
under a contract prohibited by statute, but not intrinsically wrongful.
On the arrival of a week-day, or after the repeal of the prohibiting
statute, B's conscience impells him to promise payment for the
property received. Will the promise be enforced ?,
These illustrations should be sufficient to indicate the great variety
of cases which may arise in which the moral obligation doctrine may
be invoked. May we not hope that some adequate deliverance may
be made by our Supreme Court on this subject in the near future, so
that the "clouds" that now surround it may be dissipated?
JOSEPH P. MCKRBHAN.

"

Roscola vs. Thomas, 3 S. B. 234. Summers vs. Vaughan, 35 Ind. 323.
Cook vs. Bradley, ? Conn. 57. Dawson vs. Dawson, 12 Iowa 512.

" Spear vs. Griffith, 86 III. 552. Williams vs. Hathaway, 19 Pick. 387.
Eakin vs. Fenton, 15 Ind. 59.
4 Suggested by Cooper vs. Martin, 4 East 76.

Smith vs. Ware, 13 Johns. 257.
"

252.

Ledoux vs. Buhler, 21 La. Ann. 130.

Gwinn vs. Simes, 61 Mo. 335.

vs. Alexander, 102 N. C. 95.

Melchoir vs. McCarty, 31 Wis.

Tucker vs. West, 29 Ark. 386.

Ludlow vs. Hardy, 38 Mich. 690.

Puckett
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MOOT COUIT.
KING VS. RICHARDS.
Landlord and tenant-Duty to repair-Considerationfor landlord's promise
to repair-Contributorynegligencefor tenant to remain after knowledge of dangerous defects in premises.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.,

King, a tenant of Richards, notified him of the existence of a crack in the
wall of the building. Richards promised to repair the same but failed to do so,
and the landlord was again notified that if the same were not repaired he
would move out. Shortly afterward the building fell in and injured the tenant's property. This is an action to recover damages for the damage done to
the tenant's property.
JONES for plaintiff.

Ordinary repairs are to be paid by tenant; extraordinary by the landlord.
Sheerer v. Dickson, 7 Philadelphia 472; Long v. Fitzsimmons, 1 W. & S. 532;
Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429. A promise by a landlord in consideration of an
agreement by the tenant not to abandon the premises before the expiration of
his term is without consideration unless the repairs are such which do not fall
on the tenant-A. & E. Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. 18, p. 227.
SPENCER for defendant.

No implied covenant
Dulose v. Carroll, 2 Kulp
lord. Waltz v. Rhodes,
keep premises in repair.

for landlord to repair. Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429;
89. The covenant must be express to bind the land1 W. N. C. 49. The tenant impliedly covenants to
Klein v. Jacobs, 68 Pa. 57.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question in the case is, whether a landlord can be held liable in damages to his tenant for an injury to the tenant's property caused by a defect in
the wall of the house, the landlord having promised, subsequent to the making
of the lease, to repair the same.
At common law the rule was, that in absence of any agreement between
the parties, the landlord was under no obligation to his tenant to keep the
premises in repair.
The facts are not clear as to whether Richards, the landlord, knew of the
existence of the defect in the wall at time lease was made, but, being without
evidence on this point, we will assume that he had no knowledge of it.
The landlord in leasing property does not impliedly covenant to repair;
nor does he undertake that the premises are fit for the purposes for which they
are rented, that they are tenantable or shall continue so.
He, the lessee, is bound to examine the premises he rents and secure himself by covenants to repair, and if he does not, he has no remedy, for the rule
caveat emptor applies in leases, and his eyes are his bargain. Moore v. Weber,
71 Pa. 429; Lukens v. Headley, 1 W. N. C. 266.
The great weight of authority in Pennsylvania and other states of the
Union, seems to be, that the. landlord, in absence of an express covenant, is
not bound to make repairs; nor in some cases is he bound to rebuild in case the
property is destroyed by fire. While this seems like a very harsh rule, yet it
has been the law from the earliest decisions down to the present time.
In this case it appears that King, the tenant, notified Richards of the defect in the wall and Richards told him he would repair the same, but failed
to do so. He was again notified that if the same were not repaired he would
move out.
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Consideration is essential to validity of every simple contract, agreement,
or promise and should move from the promisee to the promisor and the smallest element of benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee Is sufficient.
An agreement by the landlord at time of making of the lease, to keep the
premises in repair may be said to have been made upon sufficient consideration,
because the consideration for the lease is also consideration for the agreement
to repair; but when the agreement to repair has been made subsequently to
making of the lease a different question arises.
An agreement between landlord and tenant, made subsequent to making
of lease, that the former will make repairs, is like any other agreement, enforceable only if some consideration for it exists. The tenant being by the
lease bound to pay the rent without repairs being made escapes this duty only
by a posterior contract for which he has furnished a consideration.
Is there any consideration for the promise of Richards to repair? I am
inclined to think that there is not because King's promise to stay would not
be sufficient for the reason that he is promising to do something which he is
already legally bound to do; i. e. remain in the premises or leave and pay rent
for the remainder of the term.
When Richards leased the property he agreed to pay rent for the entire
term. and a subsequent threat to leave if repairs were not made would not be
any consideration for the landlord's promise to repair.
If the lease had expired or was about to expire then I am inclined to believe that the tenant's promise to remain for another term would be sufficient
consideration for the landlord's promise to repair; but nothing of this kind appears to have been the facts of this ease.
In this promise there is neither a benefit to the promisor nor a detriment
to the promisee. The landlord agreeing to repair would be no benefit to him,
because the tenant is already bound by the lease and cannot escape liability by
threatening to leave if repairs are not made.
I think if a tenant, having a right to remove at the end of current year,
would, by holding over and becoming liable for rent of another year, furnish a
sufficient consideration for lessor's promise during the first year to make repairs
if the tenant would remain another year; but where tenant is absolutely bound
for rent of next year his promise to remain is no consideration for the landlord's promise to repair. White v. Campion, 1 W. N. C. 130.
In Philips v. Monger, 4 Wharton 226, the court held that where a promise
to repair forms no part of the consideration for the written lease, and forms no
part of the original contract, but is a distinct and independent agreement, then
it is without any consideration whatever. Trickett on Landlord and Tenant,
p. 73.
In Hess y. Wengntuer, 5 D. Rep. (Pa.) 451, the court held that damages
arising from want of repairs can not be set off against the rent, and the same
principle applies where the premises are in such a dilapidated condition at date
of the lease as not to answer the tenant's purpose during the full extent of the
term. Wheeler v. Crawford, 86 Pa. 327 ; Reeves v. MeConesky, 168 Pa. 571;
Huber v. Baun, 152 Pa. 626.
Where the landlord sued for injury to goods from the falling of a wall the
court was of opinion that he was not bound to keep the premises in repair,
and was not responsible to the tenant for injuries resulting to the latter'sgoods
from non repair of the premises, unless he made an express covenant to repair.
Ward v. Fagin, 10 L. R. A. 147.
In case the building falls and injures the tenant's property the landlord
will not be liable for the injury, although he has covenanted to make necessary
repairs to the building, since such covenant does not include an undertaking
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that the building should not give way. Leavit v. Fletcher, 10 Allen (Mass.)
119; Dutton v. Geush, (9 Cush) 9 ; Osborn v. Capwell, 59 Borbun (N. Y.) 497;
Joffee v. Hoten, 56 N. Y. 398.
In conclusion, I am of the opinion that there can be no recovery for two
reasons: The first being that the landlord is not bound to make repairs for injuries occurring to the property after the tenant has taken possession ; it not appearing in this case that he knew of these defects before he made the lease and
if he did know of them, then the tenant also could see them by using proper
care; but if it were shown that the landlord used fraudulent means to hide
the defect in the building then the tenant could recover. The second reason
is that the tenant has shown no consideration for the landlord's promise to repair.
A promise which is nudumpactum is without validity in the eyes of the
LONG, J.
law. Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF TRE SUPREME COURT.

The landlord does not impliedly covenant that the house is or will continue
tenantable, or that he will make such repairs as may become necessary to make
it tenantable. No express covenant exists in this case. It was not the duty
of Richards, the lessor, therefore, to repair the wall independently of any
promise so to do, made subsequently to the execution of the lease. Trickett,
Landlord and Tenant, p. 71, 74.
If, however, a serious defect arises in the building, it is, on the other hand,
not the duty of the tenant to repair it. His implied covenant is to make only
ordinary and inexpensive repairs. Trickett, Landlord and Tenait, 94. The
landlord owed no duty to make the repairs required in this case, to the tenant,
nor the tenant to the landlord, and the tenant, however dangerous and uninhabitable the house became, remained obliged to pay the rent accruing during
the whole term.
From this duty to pay the rent, however, it cannot be inferred that the
tenant must continue in the occupancy of the house and thus expose himself,
his family and his goods to grave risk. He had a right to remove himself and
them.
King notified his landlord of the crack in the wall, and the latter promised
to repair it. It does not appear that King then informed Richards that he
would remove unless the repair was made, and that he would refrain from
doing so, only if the promise to repair was given. Had this appeared, enough
would have appeared to show a consideration for the promise and to make it
obligatory.
The landlord did not keep his promise. Thereupon the tenant notified
him that if the repair was not made, he would move out. This notification
does not seem to have elicited any adlitional promise from the landlord. The
repair was not made, and shortly afterwards the building fell. We think that
the learned court below properly held that there was no consideration for the
lessor's only promise, and that no action for its breach can be sustained.
Elinger v. Bahl, 208 Pa. 2.50, in some respects like the case before us, is in
others materially different. The tenant there was one from month to month.
He could have withdrawn at the end of the current month. The court finds
enough evidence to justify the inference that he promised to continue on the
premises and pay the rent for another month, in exchange for the promise of the
landlord to make the repair. So interpreted, the evidence showed a sufficient
consideration. The evidence before the trial court in this case, shows no such
consideration.
After it appeared to the tenant that the landlord was not going to repair,
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his continuance in possession would be at his own risk. Conscious of his peril,
he could not brave it, and -when the damage was incurred, claim indemnity.
His contributory negligence would have prevented. It is not necessary, however, to hold that the evidence would have justified the submission to the
jury of the existence of such negligence.
Judgment affirmed.

BEACHAM vs. P. R. R. CO.
Negligence-Duty of employer toward youthful employee-Assuming the
risks- Whether experience excuses instruction,
question for jury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Beacham, a youth of 17 years of age, was employed by the defendant, the P.
R. R. Co., as a borer or driller of holes for the reception of charges of dynamite
to be exploded in the process of mining ore. Subsequently he was changed
from this work to the more dangerous service of charging such holes with dynamite and exploding the same. He was injured by a premature explosion of
one of these charges while he was tamping it into the hole.
The evidence shows that the minor was not warned by the defendant of
danger involved In his new occupation. The defendant proved that the minor
had been employed four or five years in drilling holes for blasting purposes, had
worked at it some fifty times and at various times had charged holes with dynamite and exploded the same and was familiar with the nature and properties of dynamite.
McDONALD for the plaintiff.
It is the duty of the employer to instruct youthful employees as to the dangers incident to their employment. Rummel v. Dilworth, 131 Pa. 509. The
employer is not relieved of this duty even if the employee have knowledge of
the danger. The employee does not assume the risk incident to making a
choice between a safe and unsafe method of performing his work. Sheetram
v. Lumber Co., 13 Sup. 219; Tagg v. George, 155 Pa. 368; Roger v. Tinkler, 16
Sup. 457.
EPIPES for the defendant.

If an infant is able to appreciate the dangers of his employment, he will be
held to the degree of care ordinarily to be expected of children of his own age.
31 Pa. 372; 6 D. R. 430. The rule that workmen assume all the risks incident
to the business, although the business is especially hazardous, applies to minors.
Welsh v. Butz 202 Pa. 59; Kaufhold v. Arnold, 163 Pa. 269.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

When young persons without experience are employed to work with dangerous machines, it is the duty of the employer to give suitable instructions as to
the manner of using them, and warning as to the hazard of carelessness in
their use. If the employer neglect this duty, or if he give improper instructions,
lie is responsible for the injury resulting from his neglect or duty. He is not
answerableforinjury to adults, nor for injuries to young persons who have had
that experience from which knowledge of danger may reasonably be presumed
and that discretion which prompts to care. Tagg v. McGeorge, 155 Pa. 368.
When, however, a child knows of the danger, then his employer is not required to instruct him. Rummel v. Dilworth, 111 Pa. 343.
Prof. Bolles in his treatise, "The Liability of Employers to their Employees," sec. 24, page 25, points out a marked distinction between an employment which is hazardous in its nature, like that of coupling car2, and an employ-
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ment that is hazardous by reason of the negligence of the employer in not
having suitable machinery or servants to operate it. The present case, we
think, is one of the first class. Mr. Justice Clark has said that if one "engages
to perform a hazardous work, he assumes the risk incident thereto," (Rummeel v. Dilworth, 111 Pa. 343; P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 119 Pa. 301), but if
the master, by any negligent act involved in or reasonably incident to that
work, causes his servant to receive a personal injury, he is responsible therefor
if the servant did not otherwise contribute to the result. Woodward v.
Shumpp, 120 Pa. 458. In Johnson v. Brunner, 61 Pa. 58, Justice Williams
said: "If (the injury) was the result of the hazardous nature of the employment, without any fault on the part of the master, he is not liable; but if his
negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injury, he is responsible,
whether the employment was hazardous or not." In Welsh v. Butz, 202 Pa.
.59, it was held that the knowledge of an employee that a machine is dangerous
does not relieve the employer of the duty of instruction. It is only when the
experience of the employee has been sufficient to give him the knowledge he
would have acquired from proper instruction by the employer, that no negligence can be imputed to the employer for not giving such instructions.
Beacham had been employed for four or five years in drilling holes for
blasting purposes, had worked at it some fifty times, and at various times had
charged holes with dynamite and exploded the same. He was familiar with
the nature and properties of dynamite.
Was this experience sufficient to give Beacham the knowledge he would
have acquired from proper instructions by the employer? Did it enable him
to appreciate the danger? If it did, the employer was not bound to instruct
him. But his experience and knowledge is a question of fact for the jury.
Ingerman v. Moore, 90 Cal. 410.
If, then, the jury find that by this experience Beacham knew of the danger, appreciated it and knew the means of escaping it, i. e. how to handle
dynamite, the amount of care to use in tamping, then there can be no recovery
on the part of the plaintiff. We think this is laid down in Welsh v. Butz,
202 Pa. 59.
A servant or employee assumes the risk of all dangers in his employment,
however they may arise, against which he may protect himself by the exercise of ordinary observation and care, and the employer is not responsible for
those injuries to which the employee voluntarily subjects himself.
This rule applies to infants under the age of fourteen years, where the
employer has not been guilty of negligence. Kaufhold v. Arnold, 163 Pa. 26.),
and Welsh v. Butz supra.
Assuming, then, that the jury find that Beacham appreciated the danger and knew the means of escaping it fully as though he had been warned
by his employer, the employer, therefore, not being negligent, we award judgment for the defendant.

MENGES, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The plaintiff was 17 years old when the accident occurred, but it cannot
be said, as matter of law, that a youth of that age is not entitled to instruction
as to the dangerousness of his employment, or as to the mode of performing it,
so as best to avoid injury. Rummell v. Dilworth, 111 Pa. 343; 131 Pa. 509.
The object of instruction is to impart information. If the information is
already possessed, the instruction is unnecessary, and the omission of it cannot
be said to have caused the accident. Reese v. Hershey, 163 Pa. 253; Northern
Alabama Coal, etc., Co. v. Beacham, 37 Southern Rep. 227; Welsh v. Butz
202 Pa. 59.
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Had Beacham already the knowledge which rendered instruction superfluous? He had been employed four or five years in drilling holes; had
worked at it (what?) some fifty times. But drilling holes is one thing and
tamping dynamite another. As to the risks attending the latter, the former
could give no information. But Beacham also "at various times had charged
holes with dynamite and exploded the same." The number of these times is
not stated, nor the specific acts done by him in exploding the dynamite.
Was the explosion, in the case producing the accident, effected in the same
precise way ? Were the previous explosions numerous enough to oblige a
youth of ]7 to make an induction, the making of which should have debarred
from the precise acts which caused the mischievous explosion? The jury
surely ought to decide and not the court.
The testimony further shows that Beacham was "familiar with the nature
and properties of dynamite." But he may have been thus familiar without knowing that certain kinds of acts done by him would so affect the dynamite as to
cause it to explode. The explosions already caused by Beacham were intentional and not the unintended result of the tamping. What is there to show
that any previous experience had taught him that the process of tamping,
carefully done, might itself explode the dynamite? At all events, we think
it error for the court to substitute itself for the jury in the decision of this
question.
In Northern Alabama Coal, etc., Co. v. Beacham, supra, the court intimated that the want of muscular deftness of the youth would not make his
employment to do dangerous work requiring such deftness, a ground of liability on the part of the employer. We cannot adopt this principle. A person
might know the properties of a substance, gunpowder, nitro glycerine, a
machine, etc., and yet want the delicacy of perception and touch needful to
safely manipulate them. If the employer knows that a special degree of deftness is necessary to avoid grave accidents, and that the inexperienced person
offering himself for the work is probably not possessed of this deftness, he
should refuse the employment, or akleast cause the applicant for it to understand his defects and the risks he will incur.
It does not appear, while Beacham knew the properties of dynamite, that
he knew what special modes of handling it had to be avoided in order to
escape injury. Some instruction as to these modes might have been of vital
importance to him. That he had tamped "at various times" was no sufficient
evidence that he knew what kinds of particular manipulations he would have
to avoid. And, even if he knew, it would not follow that he had such control
of nerve and muscle and limb as would reasonably assure that he could, in
any particular case, deftly and delicately perform the task before him.
We think that the question of negligence, notwithstanding all that is
proven in the case, was for the jury.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
COMMONWEALTH VS. McDANIELS.
Assault and battery-Plea of autrefois acquit-Misdemeanorand felonyAct of 31 Mtarch, 1860, Sec. 51.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

McDaniels was brought to trial for assault with intent to kill, and he
offered evidence of a previous conviction of battery for the same attack on the
same person. The evidence was rejected. McDaniels was tried and convicted
and he appeals.
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AcKER for the appellant.
Where a greater offense includes a lesser offense, a verdict on an indictment for the minor offense only is a bar to a subsequent trial on an indictment
for the greater offense. Com. v. Arner, 149 Pa. 35; Com. v. Morgan, 9 Kulp
573; Hunter v. Com., 79 Pa. 503 ; Act 31 M~arch, 1860, P. & L. Dig. 1376.
HASSERT for Commonwealth.
It is not sufficient to say, in support of a plea of autrefois acquit, that the
transaction or facts on which the two indictments are based are the same.
The test is whether the defendant might have been convicted on the first
indictment by proof of facts alleged in the second. Com. v. Clair, 7 Allen
526; Com. v. Roby, 12 Pickering; Com. v. Wade, 12 Pickering; Heikes v.
Com., 26 Pa. 513; Com. v. Trimmer, 84 Pa. 65.
There is a difference as to quantity and kind of evidence necessary to support a conviction for simple assault and battery and that required for an
assault with intent to kill.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

This case comes before the court on an appeal by the defendant, McDaniels, from the judgment of the lower court. McDaniels assigns as error the
refusal of the Quarter Sessions Court to receive in eyidence his statement of a
former conviction for the same offense. This plea of autrefois convict was
rejected, and the cause being prosecuted, the defendant was found guilty upon
facts which had been tried before in. an indictment for assault and battery,
this second indictment, based upon the same circumstances, charging him
with assault and battery with intent to kill. In order that Mc Daniels be
enabled to plead this former conviction, let us apply the common law rule
and see if the plea was well taken. Blackstone, in the fourth book, page 336,
rules that the test is whether the evidence necessary to support the second
indictment would have been sufficient for conviction upon the first. This test
has been applied ever since ; so, existing now, it is applicable here. The facts
in both indictments are the same, and there being a conviction upon the first,
who would deny for a moment that there would not have been a similar conviction had the facts of the second indictment been substituted? The substitution is like for like. The conclusion necessarily follows that there would
have been a conviction on the first indictment had those of the second been
placed therein. But the appellee urges that one crime was lesser and the conviction for the first was for a misdemeanor and that for the second a felony.
This, however, makes no difference. The Commonwealth was derelict in electing to prosecute for the lesser, and it cannot atone for this by subsequently
prosecuting for the greater. We are not without rulings to the effect that this
cannot be done.
Where a greater offense includes a lesser one, a verdict on an indictment
for the minor offense only is a bar to a trial on an indictment for the greater
offense. This is not a mere technical rule of procedure; it is a substantial one,
which is founded in reason and in harmony with the constitutional mandate
that "no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense." Com. v. Arner,149 Pa. 35; tCom. v. Morgan, 9 Kulp, 573; Dinkey
v. Com., 17 Pa. 126.
"A conviction of one offense is a bar to a subsequent conviction on the
same facts of another offense, which cannot be separated from, or has a common constituent element with the former offense." P. & L. Digest of Decisions, 5944, Vol. IV.
In Com. v. Arner, 149 Pa. 35, the conviction was for a misdemeanor, and
the subsequent indictment for a felony on the same facts. The court ruled
that the second indictment could not sustain a verdict because of the verdict
on the first indictment. Therefore, no distinction exists in this respect
between a felony and a misdemeanor, except in murder, because the blow
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causing the assault in such a case and the blow causing murder are legally
thought to be different. The reason for such a rule is not the danger of being
twice found guilty, but of the punishment that would legally follow the
second conviction, which is the real danger guarded against by the law. The
courts have applied the constitutiohal provision to misdemeanors, and a liberal construction is given to statutes and the constitution in favor of persons
charged with crime. It is the spirit of the constitution to prevent second
punishment under judicial proceedings for the same crime as far as the common law gave that protection. It is contrary to the nature and genius of our
government to permit a second trial.
"If there is anything settled by the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man shall be twice punished by judicial judgments for the
same offense." Ex ParteLange, 85 U. S. 163.
No man shall be harassed by two prosecutions for the same offense.
Having paid the penalty attached to his crime, the law and he are even so far
as that act goes, and he has an absolute right to be free from all future molestation for the same offense. It would be contrary to justice, law and liberty,
and would be on a level with punishing one who is wholly innocent.
Furthermore, we cannot see how the lower court failed to be mindful of the
provisions of the Act of Mar. 31, 1860. The Act reads: "If upon the trial of
any person for any misdemeanor it shall appear that the facts given in evidence amount in law to a felony, such person shall not by reason thereof be
entitled to be acquitted of such misdemeanor; and no person tried for such
misdemeanor shall be liable to be afterwards prosecuted for felony on the same
facts unless the court before whom such trial may be had shall think fit, in
its discretion, to discharge the jury from giving any verdict upon such trial,
and direct such person to be indicted for felony, in which case such person
may be dealt with in all respects as if he had not been put upon his trial for
such nrisdemeanor." This is our case exactly. The court in the first trial
failed to exercise its discretion, a trial and conviction followed, and now a
second prosecution is urged for a felony upon the same facts. The courts must
follow the law as laid down, and cannot override a statute not unconstitutional
by any decision of their own. Therefore, we are of opinion that the lower court
erred in rejecting the evidence offered in the plea of autrefois convict, and in
failing to follow the statute in such cases made and provided, and judgment is
reversed and a venirefacias de novo awarded.
WOLFE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

McDaniels had committed a battery upon another, and had been convicted of this misdemeanor. He is now indicted for the same battery alleged
to have been accompanied with the intent to kill, and to have constituted
the felony described in p. 26, column 1109, 1 P. & L. Dig. of Stat.
If the Commonwealth could divide an offense into its constituents, and
indict and convict for these severally, the principle that one should not be put
twice in jeopardy might be readily evaded. The Commonwealth must, therefore, take the crime in its totality and indict for that, or, ignoring some of its
elements, in order to indict for it under a particular denomination, abstain
afterwards from indicting for the elements thus pretermitted. If, e. g., a rape
has been committed, a conviction for the act of fornication, which is embraced
in it, will preclude asubsequent conviction of the rape. Com. v. Arner, 149
Pa. 35. The conviction of a married man of fornication prevents his subsequent conviction for adultery for the same act. Coin. v. Kammerdiner, 165 Pa.
222. One who has been convicted of fornication cannot afterwards be convicted of bastardy, the result of the same act. Com. v. Lloyd, 141 Pa. 28;
Sadler, Criminal Procedure, 336.
The-51st section of the act of March 31, 1860, 1 P. & L. Dig. 1376, justifies
the conclusion drawn from it by the learned court below.
Affirmed.

